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 Introduction 
In the last 25 years the number of flexible jobs has been expanding in most European 
countries. For example, in the Netherlands in 1995, about 11 per cent of workers was working 
in a fixed-term temporary job and about 37 per cent of workers was working in a part-time 
job. Seven years later, in 2002 these percentages had increased to 14 per cent  and 44 per 
cent.1 It should be noted however, that the increase in temporary jobs already reached 13 per 
cent in 1998 and is fairly stable since, whereas the percentage of part-time jobs is still 
increasing in 2002. For the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on several forms of 
contractual flexibilisation: temporary contracts2, small part-time contracts3, on-call and 
replacement contracts, casual and seasonal work and work with temporary work agencies. 
These jobs are all defined as non-standard employment. 
 
Non-standard jobs have been given a lot of attention in the policy debate and not only in the 
Netherlands. They were often seen as a means to increase labour market flexibility and labour 
turnover as a means to foster economic growth and employment growth in particular. 
Subsequently, unemployment would be decreased. However, the success of such a policy 
depends heavily on the mobility from non-standard into standard employment. If this mobility 
is very low, contractual flexibilisation will not lead to reduced unemployment but rather to 
increased job insecurity for people at the lower end of the labour market. If flex-workers do 
not succeed in making a transition into a standard job they often face spells of (partial) 
unemployment and experience insecure income prospects.  
                                                 
1 Source: Employment in Europe, 2003. 
2 Temporary contracts without the prospect for tenure. 
3 Small part-time jobs are less than 12 hours per week. Bigger permanent part-time jobs  are considered to be 
standard, since they are so prevalent in the Netherlands. 
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A related policy question concerns the extent to which other government policies such as 
minimum wages or social welfare programmes may complement or substitute the 
flexibilisation of working times and contracts by providing incentives for entry into the labour 
market. The level of the welfare benefits the household receives when out of work and the 
level of the minimum wage will affect the incentives/disincentives to accept a flexible job or 
to move into a standard job.  Flexible jobs may not be attractive to unemployed individuals, 
especially if the net present value offered is at or even below the net present value of a job 
with the minimum wage or benefit level. Under this set up, flexible and small part-time jobs 
would be acceptable only to individuals not claiming social security benefits and possibly out 
of the labour force.  
 
The primary goal in this paper is to investigate the role of a whole range of possible 
determinants of labour market transitions on a labour market that is characterized by a 
substantial ‘non-standard job segment’ (see Figure 1) 
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FIGURE 1 POSSIBLE TRANSITIONS 
 
The question that will be answered first is what are the determinants of transitions on this 
labour market, especially those from non-standard jobs and from nonemployment. From 
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nonemployment people can make a transition to either a non-standard job (Transition 1) or a 
standard job (Transition 2). Workers in non-standard jobs can go to nonemployment 
(Transition 3) or to a standard job (Transition 4).  What characteristics play a role in 
explaining these transitions? Both nonemployment and non-standard work will be used as a 
starting point. We take a labour supply perspective and base our empirical research on 
household panel data. The economic theoretical framework is job search theory. In order to 
estimate the coefficients of interest accurately we have to take into account that workers are 
(self-) selected into these states by the same characteristics that are used to explain the 
transitions. To correct for these selection issues, a panel multinomial logit model with 
individual unobserved heterogeneity will be estimated besides the standard multinomial logit 
model. 
 
Earlier work and the contribution of this research 
Earlier research on segmented labour markets has concentrated on the lack of mobility 
between the two (or more) segments. Dual labour market theory assumes the absence of 
mobility between segments, without empirically testing this assumption. There is very little 
evidence that labour markets can be subdivided into two or more well-defined and self-
contained segments. 
It can be argued that wage formation is different in different parts of the labour market in the 
sense that the pay off to human capital variables is significantly different in the different 
segments.  This is another characteristic of dual labour market theory and for this hypothesis 
extensive evidence has been found, especially on the return on education (McNabb, 1987; 
McNabb and Ryan, 1990) in the two segments.  In the 1990s empirical work on non-standard, 
flexible or non-standard types of employment often took a static approach. Only descriptive 
statistics were presented or at best, occupying a certain labour market status was explained 
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rather than explaining transitions between different labour market states. (See Felstead &  
Jewson (1999), Murphy (1996), Casey et al. (1997) for international studies and several OSA 
labour market trends reports (2003, 2002, 2001, 2000) and   Goudswaard (2003) for the 
Netherlands).  Only after the introduction of longitudinal data with sufficient information on 
employment contracts it was possible to systematically investigate labour market transitions 
to and from non-standard jobs. (Muffels et al, 1998, Dekker et al, 1999, 2000, 2001). The 
results from this research indicated that indeed a lot of transitions took place every year 
between non-standard and standard employment, not only in the Netherlands but also in the 
United Kingdom (also see Booth et al (1999, 2002) and Germany. Similar findings were 
obtained for other European countries in a study about male workers (Muffels & Luijkx., 
2004). Other recent contributions on job mobility in a segmented labour market involve 
studies about mobility out of subsidized employment in the Netherlands (Van Ours, 2004), 
labour market mobility and social exclusion in Great Britain (Bradley et al, 2003), labour 
market flexibility and macroeconomic consequences for 21 OECD countries (Di Tella & 
MacCulloch, 2003). Other recent contributions from economists have taken a firm perspective 
and look at the optimal use of flexible labour by firms (Pinker & Larson, 2002) and its 
consequences for labour productivity (Magnani, 2003) and work safety (Guadalupe, 2003). 
Furthermore, not exclusively economic contributions come from sociology and public health 
science and focus on flexible staffing arrangements in US firms (Kalleberg, 2000; Kalleberg 
et al, 2000, 2003), flexible labour and social exclusion in Great Britain (Bradley et al, 2003), 
flexible labour and the transition into adulthood (Golsch, 2003), and  healt inequalities that 
could follow from labour market segmentation (Virtanen et al, 2003). 
The contribution of this paper lies in the fact that the analysis of dynamic labour market 
transitions is firmly based in economic job search theory. Furthermore panel data are used to 
be able to capture the true dynamics of the labour market. The relative transition probabilities 
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are modelled, rather than the relative probabilities of occupying a certain labour market state. 
An econometric model is used that formally tackles the selection bias issue that stems from 
state dependence in dynamic labour market models. The selection bias follows from the fact 
that workers are (self)selected into some labour market state. The factors that influence the 
transition rate out of that labour market state are likely to be similar to the ones of the initial 
selection. When estimating a transition model, this causes a biased estimation of the relevant 
parameters. This problem is addressed with the specification of a panel multinomial logit 
model with unobserved heterogeneity.  
It is hypothesized that transition rate to standard employment for workers with higher 
endowments of human capital are higher and transition rates of workers with higher leisure 
preference (or family commitment) are lower. Family commitment still seems to play an 
important role for Dutch women. Furthermore it is investigated whether or not some non-
standard jobs (small part-time jobs, on-call contracts, temporary contracts) will have higher or 
lower transition probabilities than others. Other covariates include firm size to capture the 
effect of job ladders often found in larger firms, labour market history of the worker and the 
hourly wage as additional measures of human capital and year dummies to correct for the 
business cycle. 
 
1. Non-standard jobs and transitions: a job search approach 
Standard neoclassical economic theory does not provide a straightforward answer to the 
questions posed in the introduction. The aim of the paper is to examine the flows out of non-
standard employment and nonemployment into standard employment. The theoretical 
background model for our empirical specification is based on job search theory. The search 
for a non-standard job can be modelled in a similar manner as the search process for a 
standard job. Some suppliers of labour will prefer a standard job because of the offered wage 
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or job security whereas others prefer a temporary or part-time job because of caring 
obligations, working time flexibility and leisure time preferences. Differences do appear when 
we take into account that on-the-job-search from a flexible job can be different from search 
from a standard full-time job.  It has been frequently and successfully applied for studying 
transitions from unemployment or non-participation into employment (cf. Lipmann & 
McCall, 1976, Mortensen, 1970, 1977, 1986, Kiefer & Neumann, 1989; Narendranatan & 
Nickell, 1985, 1986, Hujer & Schneider, 1989). 
Since job search behaviour in the presence of flexible, non-standard employment contracts is 
obviously affected by institutional constraints like the rationing of standard jobs, replacement 
rate of unemployment benefit and the minimum social security benefit, we make an attempt to 
incorporate these institutional variables as covariates in the empirical model. Furthermore an 
institutional approach involves recognizing that labour supply decisions are often made in a 
household rather than as an individual. Finally we have to allow for on-the-job search for 
workers in non-standard jobs. 
 
2. A job search model 
Job search theory focuses on the job search process of suppliers of labour. In job search 
models the probability of leaving unemployment or of taking up a new job is equal to the 
product of the probabilities of receiving a job offer and of accepting it. In the standard job 
search model, jobs are fully characterised by the wage offered. The job seeker knows the 
distribution of wages in the relevant segment of the labour market. Every time a job offer 
occurs -in the standard search models, at standard time intervals- the individual takes the 
decision whether or not to accept the job. This decision is based on the comparison of the 
marginal costs of search (out of pocket costs plus opportunity costs) and the marginal benefits 
(alternative returns). The optimal strategy is to search until the point is reached where 
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marginal costs equal marginal benefits. The level of the corresponding wage is called the 
reservation wage below which people accept no job offers. The reservation wage is therefore 
a crucial variable in these models. It is assumed to be influenced by a number of variables 
such as personal characteristics, employment-unemployment history, institutional variables 
and, in particular, the level and the duration of unemployment benefits (or, in the case of on-
the-job search, the current level of wages).  
We have stated before that searching for a non-standard job is similar to a ‘normal’ search 
process. For some individuals job offers will consist of non-standard jobs only while for 
others standard jobs are offered also. These latter workers face “competing risks”. The 
decision space for the first group of workers is restricted (rationed) to non-standard jobs and 
therefore their transition probabilities to standard employment will be low. Some workers 
with higher capital endowments may be able to choose between non-standard and a standard 
jobs.  
Job search theory will shape the empirical model through the inclusion of explanatory 
variables, in particular, those explaining the level of the reservation wage.  Since job offers 
are no longer fully characterized by the wage only but also by the prespecified number of 
hours per week and duration of the contract, the term reservation value is used instead of 
reservation wage.  
In the model considered here, the job seeker is faced with the following problem (Roy (1951), 
Heckman & Honore (1990), Magnac (1991)) and will choose: 
⎪⎪⎩
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hours, w the hourly wage and (1/(1+r)) the discount rate. For a standard job the duration d is 
assumed to be indefinite. The reservation wage is dependent on the unknown distribution of 
values of job offers. Thus the job seeker has imperfect information about the value of jobs she 
can get on the market. This imperfect information and the rational behaviour of the job seeker 
lead to search behaviour with the so-called reservation wage (reservation value property). 
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That is, in a standard job search model a worker will accept offers above the reservation wage 
and will continue search is the wage offer is lower than the reservation wage. Subsequently, 
the higher the reservation wage, the longer the worker will search and the lower her exit 
probability out of unemployment. 
In the circumstance that the worker is faced with two types of exit to employment (both 
standard and non-standard), this reservation wage (or reservation value) property still holds. 
Given a job value distribution, the reservation value of a job seeker will then depend on his 
leisure (home production) preferences and nonwage (for the nonemployed) or wage (for on-
the-job-seekers) income. Furthermore, the job seeker will recognize the fact that temporary 
jobs are likely to result in a new spell of nonemployment in the future. 
This theoretical model leads to the inclusion of several variables in the empirical model. The 
expectations of the (possibly nonemployed) jobseeker are based on her level of human capital, 
so we want to include variables like age, experience and schooling level. Additional 
determinants of human capital are (un)employment history and the hourly wage for on-the-job 
 9
seekers. Preferences for leisure (family commitment) are modelled through including 
information on gender, number of children, marital status. Furthermore the notion that labour 
supply decisions take place in a household context, a proxy for other household income (both 
labour income of other household members and non-labour income) is included. 
 
3. The data 
 
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). The 
survey sample is a random sample drawn from the Dutch postal addresses register file. The 
survey started in 1984 with 12,000 respondents in 5,000 households. The SEP provides 
information on various types of labour market transitions of individuals over a period of 18 
years (1984-2001). It is a great pity that the 2001 wave is the last wave of data that is 
available.  
The SEP did not contain much information on different types of flexible or non-standard 
labour in the earlier waves except for the waves of October 1988 and 1991. The last seven 
waves of data (1995-2001) will be used to examine transitions from non-standard jobs into 
standard jobs and nonparticipation the next year. For those years we have constructed a 
discrete dependent variable ‘labour market status’ based on the type of contract, which is 
either ‘Nonemployment’, ‘Non-standard employment’ or ‘Standard employment’.  The self-
employed are excluded from the analysis. Furthermore a set of covariates is drawn from these 
data, including human capital variables (age, schooling, experience), household variables 
(marital status, number of children, household income), job characteristics (hourly wage, 
industry sector, firmsize) and employment history variables. 
The earlier waves of the SEP do contain sufficient information on employment history, which 
allows us to construct employment histories (3 years prior to the base year of the transition) of 
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all workers. For 1995, 1996 and 1997 we will use the available information from 1991 to 
1994 for these employment history variables.  
Both annual income (from tax records, income from the year before the survey year) and 
monthly income (direct survey question) are available. To determine a proxy for the hourly 
wage, we use the reported number of hours worked per week and the monthly take home 
wage. Human capital variables are included in the model.  
The following labour market statuses will be distinguished: 
Labour market status Qualifications 
Non employment  
(including unemployment) 
All persons between 15 and 64 without a job, 
and not available for a job (nonparticipation) 
All persons between 15 and 64 without a job, 
willing to accept a >12 hour job within two 
weeks (unemployment) 
Non-standard employment All persons between 15 and 64 with any kind 
of paid work, on different types of flexible 
contracts or for less than 12 hours per week 
Standard employment (including part-time) All persons between 15 and 64, with a 
standard  (permanent) contract, with 12 or 
more hours per week 
 
Firstly, we look at the number of weekly hours actually worked to distinguish small part-time, 
part-time and full-time jobs.  Secondly, we distinguish the self-employed (and their co-
workers who are not employees) and exclude them from the analyses. The employees are 
subdivided into employees with a permanent or a temporary job, respectively. 
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Thirdly, we distinguish private employment agency jobs and specific flexible jobs (e.g. on-
call contracts) from other jobs. The fourth dimension makes a distinction between non-
standard (flexible) and standard (both part-time and full-time) jobs. Non-standard jobs include 
the following categories: 
• Short hours part-time jobs (including permanent) 
• Temporary jobs 
• Specific flexible jobs (on-call contracts, etc.) 
• Private employment agency job 
 
4. Descriptive statistics 
In Figure 2 the relative importance of non-standard employment in the Netherlands is shown, 
as a percentage of the working age population.  In 1991 the percentage of non-standard 
workers was below 10 per cent, and a steady increase can be observed until the end of the 
century.  The share of non-standard workers is then relatively stable around 14 per cent and 
decreasing a little in 1999, 2000 and 2001. This could well be the result of the tightening 
labour market in the Netherlands in the latter 1990s. Workers did not have to settle for a non-
standard job, and more standard jobs were available. The further reduction of the percentage 
of people in nonemployment is a confirmation of that hypothesis4. 
                                                 
4 In the data for 1992, 1993 and 1994 information on some non-standard (temporary, on-call) contracts is missing. 
This also explains the strange pattern of transition probabilities for 1991-1994 in Figure 3   
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FIGURE 2 PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS IN NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
(SOURCE: STATISTICS NETHERLANDS, OWN CALCULATIONS) 
 
In Figure 3, the yearly transition probabilities out of non-standard employment are depicted. 
Yearly transition percentages from base year (Netherlands 1991-2001)
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FIGURE 3 TRANSITION PROBABILITIES TO STANDARD EMPLOYMENT AND 
NONEMPLOYMENT 
(SOURCE: STATISTICS NETHERLANDS, OWN CALCULATIONS) 
 
It is obvious from the graph that the transition rate into standard employment is increasing 
from 1995 onwards. The yearly transition probability increases from around 20 per cent to 
around 30 per cent in 2001. In comparison, the transition rate into nonemployment does not 
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show a clear trend and seems relatively stable at around 15 per cent. This is again in line with 
the notion of a tightening labour market in the late 1990s in the Netherlands.  
 
From this two graphs we would expect that the year dummies that will be incorporated in the 
empirical model will have positive effects on the transition rate(s) to standard employment, 
both from nonemployment and from non-standard employment. 
 
5. A dynamic model of labour market transitions 
The labour market transitions call for a dynamic analysis of discrete patterns. This involves 
analyses of Markov chains with three states: Nonemployment (NE), Non-standard 
employment (NR) and Standard employment (R) (see Figure 4).  For each transition period (t, 
t+1) the probability of moving from state i to state j can be defined (i,j∈{NE, NR, R}) ijP
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FIGURE 4 TRANSITION PATTERNS 
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The standard approach for a static limited dependent variables model is to use a multinomial 
logit model.  
When limited dependent variable models are used to model relative transition probabilities 
from one state to another rather than relative probabilities of occupying a certain state, 
problems of selection bias (caused by initial selection or state dependence) have to be faced. 
One way to adapt the multinomial logit model to correct for selection is to model relative 
probabilities of occupying a certain labour market state and then add the lagged (labour 
market) state (that is, the discrete choice variable) as an explanatory variable (Gong et al., 
2000, Heckman, 1981).  
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with  a vector of dummy variables indicating lagged labour market state and of interactions 
of this dummy with . This is equivalent to adding the lagged discrete choice variable. 
Furthermore an individual random effect 
z
x
ijα is added to be able to control for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is assumed to be time invariant for each 
individual and could be different for each destination state:  
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In an alternative but equivalent approach, Nguyen et al (2000) & Kaiser (2001) model the 
relative transition probabilities and estimate a random effects multinomial logit model with 
time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
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This is equivalent if the selection bias is only transferred through the individual effect. The 
individual effect terms jijjj ′′υσ are assumed to be mutually independent and independent of the 
covariates x , with mean 0 and variance . The random variable 
2
jj ′σ jij ′υ  is assumed to be 
standard normal distributed.  The parameters  indicating the unobserved individual effect 
have to be estimated and then integrated out in order to compute the likelihood function for 
the observations and to obtain (see Nguyen et al, 2000): 
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with ( )⋅ϕ  the density of the standard normal distribution. Following Stern (1997) it is possible 
to approximate this expression by the following simulators: 
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with  independent draws from the standard normal distribution. The log likelihood 
function is obtained by summing these simulated expected probabilities over all individuals 
and years. Then maximum likelihood methods can be used to estimate the parameters of 
interest. Finally, a simple likelihood ratio test can be performed to assess whether the 
extended model with unobserved heterogeneity is an improvement or not. 
h
ijkυ
 
Estimation results 
Two models are estimated for transitions from nonemployment and non-standard 
employment, respectively. The first model (Model I) is a standard multinomial logit model, 
but with robust estimation methods and clustering on the level of the individual. This means 
that we recognize that observations for the same person are, by definition, interrelated and can 
therefore not be regarded as independent. This model can be estimated by standard 
procedures. 
The second model is the one that corrects for selection biases and is a panel multinomial logit 
model with random (individual) effects. It involves adding a time-invariant covariate for each 
individual that indicates something like ‘labour market ability’. 
The models are estimated both for the nonemployed (transitions to non-standard employment 
and standard employment) and for non-standard workers (transitions to nonemployment and 
standard employment. In Table 1 the results for the transitions from nonemployment are 
presented, the results for the transitions from non-standard employment can be found in Table 
2 
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Table 1 
Transitions from nonemployment 
Coefficients from multinomial logit regression, relative to staying in origin state 
(nonemployment) 
Model I: Multinomial logit model with robust standard errors and clustering on 
individuals 
Model II: Panel multinomial logit model with unobserved heterogeneity 
 
 Model I Model II 
 To Non-
standard 
employment 
To Standard 
employment 
To Non-
standard 
employment 
To Standard 
employment 
0.201 -0.153 0.208 -0.140 Woman 
 (0.131) (0.173) (0.135) (0.170) 
0.414 0.195 0.439 0.205 Married 
 (0.198)** (0.196) (0.207)** (0.206) 
-0.437 -1.174 -0.479 -1.218 Married woman 
 (0.192)** (0.232)*** (0.200)** (0.236)*** 
0.206 0.630 0.238 0.652 Divorced 
 (0.439) (0.320)** (0.410) (0.325)** 
0.055 -0.989 0.019 -1.036 Divorced woman 
 (0.473) (0.424)** (0.442) (0.432)** 
-0.045 0.189 -0.044 0.195 Age  
(0.024)* (0.032)*** (0.025)* (0.033)*** 
-0.040 -0.342 -0.046 -0.355 Age squared 
 (0.031) (0.042)*** (0.032) (0.045)*** 
-0.103 -0.110 -0.110 -0.120 Number of 
children  (0.055)* (0.069) (0.056)** (0.069)* 
0.274 0.035 0.287 0.039 Woman with 
children  (0.136)** (0.187) (0.138)** (0.192) 
-0.446 -0.372 -0.463 -0.395 Child younger 
than 6 yrs (0.098)*** (0.137)*** (0.101)*** (0.138)*** 
    Educational level 
dummies 
(reference: 
primary education) 
  
  
0.823 0.311 0.856 0.346 Lower secondary 
education  (0.111)*** (0.151)** (0.114)*** (0.152)** 
0.94 0.282 0.990 0.334  Higher secondary 
education (0.111)*** (0.142)** (0.116)*** (0.145)** 
1.403 0.737 1.455 0.780 Higher vocational 
education (0.150)*** (0.197)*** (0.158)*** (0.200)*** 
1.176 1.094 1.258 1.173 University degree 
(0.315)*** (0.308)*** (0.314)*** (0.326)*** 
1.114 0.741 1.155 0.789 Currently 
unemployed (0.135)*** (0.175)*** (0.135)*** (0.174)*** 
Employment     
 18
history dummies     
0.512 0.498 0.514 0.501 Non-standard job 
in last three years (0.064)*** (0.082)*** (0.061)*** (0.087)*** 
0.15 0.064 0.176 0.092 Unemployed in 
last three years (0.090)* (0.122) (0.093)* (0.128) 
0.252 0.778 0.265 0.794 Standard job in 
last three years (0.058)*** (0.061)*** (0.062)*** (0.060)*** 
-0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.007 Non labour 
household income (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** 
-0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.007 Other labour 
income in 
household 
(0.001)* (0.002)*** 
(0.001)* (0.002)*** 
    Year dummies 
    
0.166 0.462 0.201 0.503 1996 
(0.105) (0.143)*** (0.109)* (0.150)*** 
0.256 0.551 0.317 0.619 1997 
(0.107)** (0.142)*** (0.116)*** (0.156)*** 
0.068 0.274 0.128 0.332 1998 
(0.113) (0.153)* (0.121) (0.162)** 
-1.059 -5.411 -1.130 -5.567 Constant 
(0.395)*** (0.560)*** (0.417)*** (0.595)*** 
   0.500 Indiv. eff. for 
trans. to non-
standard work 
  
 (0.180)*** 
   0.568 Indiv. eff. for 
trans. to standard 
work 
  
 
(0.265)** 
 
No. of 
Observations 
 9778  9778 
Pseudo R2  0.1851   
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
 -3896.1464   
Log likelihood    -3894.2341 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses (Model I) 
Standard errors in parentheses (Model II) 
  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
  
 
 
First of all a simple likelihood ratio (LR) test is performed to check whether the model with 
unobserved heterogeneity has added value, in other words if the model without unobserved 
heterogeneity is rejected by the data. 
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The LR test statistic is calculated as ,where  is the value of the log 
likelihood under the null hypothesis (no unobserved heterogeneity), and 
)ln(ln2 * LLLR −−= *ln L
Lln is the log 
likelihood under the alternative. This statistic is distributed as with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of restrictions under the null hypothesis (3). Thus we compare both the 
value of the LR test statistic for transitions from nonemployment  (3.82, derived from Table 
1) and for transitions from non-standard employment (5.29, derived from Table 2) and 
compare it with the value (3)=7.81. This means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, 
both for the transitions from non-standard employment and those from nonemployment. 
2χ
2
95.0χ
 
Transitions from nonemployment 
In spite of not being able to reject the null hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity, results 
for both specifications for the transitions out of nonemployment are fairly similar. The 
coefficients have the same sign and are in the same order of magnitude for all covariates in 
both specifications. Women are more likely to got to non-standard jobs and less likely to go to 
standard jobs than men are, but not significantly. Marriage has a positive effect on the 
transition probability to both standard and non-standard employment, but only for men. For 
women, this effect is negative, especially for transitions to standard employment. Male 
divorcees are more likely to go to a standard job in contrast to their female counterparts. The 
“U-shaped” age effect on the relative transition probability to standard employment is 
significant.  The effect of age is positive and declining for workers younger than (≈)28  years 
of age for transitions to standard jobs. Beyond that age, the transition probability will 
decrease5. For transitions to non-standard employment the effect of age is linear and negative. 
The older a nonemployed worker, the lower the transition probability into non-standard 
employment. 
                                                 
5 These age thresholds are determined by inferring algebraically at what age the age function is maximized.  
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A higher number of children in the household decreases the transition probability to 
employment, both standard and non-standard. For women, the presence of children increases 
their transition probability to non-standard employment.  Furthermore the presence of a young 
child (younger than six years) decreases the transition probabilities to both standard and non-
standard employment. This is a clear indication of leisure (home production) preferences for 
the nonemployed with children, not necessarily only for women.  
As expected, higher levels of educational attainment have the expected positive effect on the 
transition to work although the effects are much stronger (and more significant) for transitions 
to non-standard employment.  
Unemployed workers are more likely to find employment (both non-standard and standard), 
as we would expect, since they are available for work and have to look for jobs in order to be 
eligible for their benefit.  
All job-history variables have a positive effect on to work transitions. Remarkably previous 
unemployment experience (at least once in the past three years) has a positive effect on the 
transition probability to non-standard employment. This is an indication that previous search 
behaviour (as required for receiving unemployment benefit) results in higher transition rates 
into non-standard employment in the following years. This is a confirmation of the earlier 
finding for currently unemployed jobseekers, who are also more likely to go find non-
standard employment. Previous experience in a standard job makes the return rate into 
standard employment significantly higher.  
Non-labour household income has a negative effect on the transition rate to non-standard 
employment and a positive effect on the transition rate into standard employment. This could 
be the result of higher reservation values or the relative unattractiveness of non-standard jobs 
in terms of increasing household income. The same effect can be found for the labour income 
of other household members. Furthermore it could indicate that labour market success of 
 21
other household members (resulting in higher levels of “Other labour income in household”) 
increases the chances of nonemployed household members in the sense that they are more 
likely to get a standard job. Year dummies all have significantly positive coefficients, 
indicating the increasing levels of (both standard and non-standard) employment in the 
Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s. 
 
Transitions from non-standard employment 
Again we can observe fairly similar results for both model specifications for the transitions 
out of non-standard employment. Marriage has a positive effect on the transition probability 
to standard employment for men, but for married women the effect is negative. Just as with 
transition from non-standard employment we see a significant effect of the quadratic age 
function on both relative transition probabilities. Older non-standard workers are more likely 
to go to standard employment and less likely to fall back into nonemployment and this effect 
is decreasing. After a certain age this effect is reversed. So, older (>40 yrs) non-standard 
workers are more likely to go into nonemployment and non-standard worker over 30 are less 
likely to get a standard job.  
Higher levels of educational attainment do increase the transition probability to standard 
employment but only significantly for Educational level 4. 
Two subcategories of non-standard employment, small part-time jobs and on-call work, have 
lower transition rates to standard employment than other non-standard jobs (temporary work 
contracts, temp agency work). Furthermore, non-standard work in the primary sector does less 
often lead to standard work and more often to nonemployment compared to other sectors.  
An employment history with previous experience in standard employment increases the 
transition rate into standard employment and decreases the transition rate into 
nonemployment for non-standard workers. But experience in non-standard employment does 
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decrease the transition probability to standard employment, as does previous unemployment. 
However, previous non-standard work experience does reduce the transition probability to 
nonemployment. 
Non-labour household income and the labour income of other household member do not 
significantly influence either transition probability for non-standard workers. 
The significance of the coefficients with the year dummies for the transition probability to 
standard employment is again a clear indication of the employment growth in the Netherlands 
in the late 1990s. A bit surprisingly the transition rate into nonemployment is also increased. 
A plausible explanation would be the high volatility involved with working in a non-standard 
job. Finally in model II we can observe a significant individual effect for the transition to 
nonemployment, as we expected after the result of the LR test. 
 
Table 2 
Transitions from non-standard employment 
Coefficients from multinomial logit regression, relative to staying in origin state (non-
standard employment) 
Model I: Multinomial logit model with robust standard errors and clustering on 
individuals 
Model II: Panel multinomial logit model with unobserved heterogeneity 
 
 Model I Model II 
 To 
Nonemployment
To Standard 
employment 
To 
Nonemployment
To Standard 
employment 
-0.005 0.094 -0.016 0.085 Woman 
 (0.159) (0.145) (0.163) (0.149) 
-0.168 0.368 -0.152 0.371 Married 
 (0.268) (0.221)* (0.272) (0.208)* 
0.213 -0.630 0.207 -0.633 Married woman 
 (0.258) (0.228)*** (0.267) (0.223)*** 
-0.136 0.682 -0.099 0.703 Divorced 
 (0.630) (0.450) (0.633) (0.434) 
-0.133 -0.093 -0.163 -0.111 Divorced woman 
 (0.683) (0.508) (0.690) (0.485) 
-0.097 0.087 -0.098 0.088 Age  
(0.034)*** (0.036)** (0.035)*** (0.035)** 
0.122 -0.147 0.122 -0.149 Age squared 
 (0.044)*** (0.048)*** (0.045)*** (0.047)*** 
Number of -0.008 0.015 -0.016 0.011 
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children  (0.073) (0.070) (0.075) (0.072) 
-0.027 -0.249 -0.007 -0.243 Woman with 
children  (0.175) (0.169) (0.177) (0.173) 
0.061 -0.073 0.064 -0.072 Child younger 
than 6 yrs (0.134) (0.129) (0.137) (0.133) 
    Educational level 
dummies 
(reference: 
primary education) 
  
  
-0.224 -0.030 -0.234 -0.035 Lower secondary 
education  (0.150) (0.187) (0.158) (0.182) 
-0.222 0.232 -0.254 0.213  Higher secondary 
education  (0.152) (0.178) (0.159) (0.172) 
-0.289 0.502 -0.308 0.486 Higher vocational 
education (0.209) (0.207)** (0.217) (0.204)** 
-0.534 0.223 -0.530 0.216 University degree 
(0.348) (0.299) (0.363) (0.277) 
-0.099 -1.131 -0.117 -1.145 Small job 
(0.120) (0.131)*** (0.124) (0.128)*** 
-0.021 -0.441 -0.026 -0.441 On-call job 
(0.111) (0.128)*** (0.117) (0.126)*** 
-0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 Hourly wage 
(0.005) (0.003)* (0.005) (0.004) 
-0.215 0.227 -0.227 0.226 Large firm 
(0.145) (0.115)** (0.146) (0.113)** 
0.371 -0.762 0.402 -0.748 Primary sector 
(0.240) (0.367)** (0.245) (0.369)** 
-0.091 -0.126 -0.099 -0.132 Government sector 
(0.120) (0.112) (0.122) (0.113) 
    Employment 
history dummies     
-0.340 -0.119 -0.327 -0.110 Non-standard job 
in last three years (0.053)*** (0.054)** (0.054)*** (0.055)** 
-0.060 -0.204 -0.070 -0.213 Unemployed in 
last three years (0.121) (0.114)* (0.126) (0.113)* 
-0.125 0.301 -0.124 0.301 Standard job in 
last three years (0.070)* (0.057)*** (0.071)* (0.056)*** 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 Non labour 
household income (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other labour 
income in 
household 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
    Year dummies 
    
0.125 0.697 0.161 0.718 1996 
(0.135) (0.145)*** (0.141) (0.145)*** 
0.263 0.874 0.317 0.903 1997 
(0.131)** (0.143)*** (0.143)** (0.145)*** 
0.277 0.543 0.334 0.573 1998 
(0.138)** (0.144)*** (0.148)** (0.148)*** 
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1.191 -2.199 1.200 -2.192 Constant 
(0.586)** (0.614)*** (0.597)** (0.601)*** 
  
Indiv. eff. for 
trans. to 
nonemployment   
-0.490 
(0.185)***  
   Indiv. eff. for 
trans. to standard 
employment    
-0.267 
(0.203) 
     
No. of 
Observations  
3409  3409 
Pseudo R2  0.1155   
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
 -2914.7086   
Log likelihood    -2912.0615 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (Model I) 
Standard errors in parentheses (Model II) 
  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
  
   
 
Summary and conclusions 
The labour market in the Netherlands is characterised by quite some mobility between the 
various labour market states. The high mobility rates between non-standard and standard jobs, 
except for the small jobs and on-call contracts as part of non-standard employment, provide 
arguments for defending the hypothesis that the Dutch labour market is not characterised by a 
clear-cut segmentation of non-standard and standard jobs.   
In this paper, we have investigated transitions out of nonemployment and non-standard jobs in 
the Netherlands. Non-standard jobs have been defined broadly as including small part-time 
jobs (including permanent jobs and the self-employed); temporary jobs; specific flexible jobs 
(on-call contracts, etc.);  jobs via temporary employment agencies.  
The opposite concept is that of ‘standard’ jobs which have been defined to include any job 
with a permanent contract, either part-time or full-time. We define also a residual state, 
nonemployment, which includes all individuals out of work. We carry out descriptive analysis 
of transitions into and out of non-standard jobs. 
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The use of a longitudinal dataset, the Dutch Socio Economic panel, allows us to observe 
transitions in and out of non-standard jobs into standard jobs or non-participation and 
unemployment. We restrict the analysis to the last seven waves of the panel for which 
sufficient information is available on the type of labour contract, 1995 to 2001.  
It is interesting to look at this issue for the Netherlands given the recent increase in the size of 
the flexible workforce.  The topic is especially important given the rising interest in ‘flexible’ 
jobs as a mean to bring back the long-term unemployed and more generally non-participants 
into the labour market. 
The analysis carried out in this paper focuses on the determinants of labour market transitions 
involving non-standard jobs. The results indicate that older workers are more likely to move 
from non-standard jobs into standard jobs up to a certain age. The same effect can be found 
for the nonemployed but only for transitions to standard employment.  Married women in 
non-standard jobs or in nonemployment are less likely to get a standard job than men.  
Nonemployed divorcees are more likely to find a standard job, but divorced women in 
nonemployment are less likely to find standard employment. Marital status seems to play a 
more important role for women than it does for men. 
 
Older non-standard workers are more likely to go to standard employment and less likely to 
fall back into nonemployment. After a certain age this effect is reversed. This is an indication 
that non-standard jobs are not only used as a ‘stepping stone’ to standard employment but also 
as an exit route into retirement. The older someone gets in nonemployment the higher the 
chance that he/she will find standard employment. Again this effect is decreasing with age 
and will eventually be negative. At the same time this effect cannot be found for transitions to 
non-standard employment. There the effect of age is negative and the chances of finding a 
non-standard job are reduced with getting older.   
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A puzzling finding is that the level of educational attainment does not seem to influence the 
transition rates from non-standard jobs, especially since they do influence the relative 
probability of making a transition into work from nonemployment.  Only a higher vocational 
degree has a positive effect on getting standard employment from non-standard employment. 
Other household income has a negative effect on the transition rate to non-standard 
employment and a positive effect on the transition rate into standard employment for the 
nonemployed. This holds for both non-labour income as for labour income of other household 
members. Once employed (in a non-standard job) the effect of other household income 
(labour or non-labour) is insignificant. A tentative conclusion could be that nonemployed 
jobseekers ‘wait’ for a standard job offer, rather than accepting a non-standard job. 
An important finding is that there is a high degree of path dependence in labour market 
transitions. Earlier experience in standard employment increases the transition probabilities 
into standard employment, both for the nonemployed and for non-standard workers. Earlier 
experience in either non-standard or non-standard employment also reduces the probability of 
‘falling back’ into nonemployment. Previous unemployment does not reduce the chances of 
finding a job for the nonemployed but does reduce the chances of finding a standard job for 
non-standard workers.  This is often called a ‘scarring’ effect in wage regression analyses(e.g. 
Arulampalam, 2001). 
 
Furthermore it is very clear that employment growth in the latter half of the 1990s the 
Netherlands has increased the transition probabilities into both non-standard and standard 
work. This was already noted with the descriptive statistics in Figures 2 and 3 and is 
confirmed by the significant effects for the year dummies in the multivariate analyses. 
A limit of the present analysis is that we had to aggregate over rather different categories of 
flexible jobs (small part-time jobs, temporary jobs, jobs with a private employment agency, 
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on-call contracts). The dummy variables for different non-standard job types in the 
multinomial logit analyses are not an entirely satisfactory solution. With a larger number of 
observations and/or more waves of data it would be possible to perform separate analyses for 
different job types.  
The results in this paper raise more questions than they answer. Some issues, which are not 
addressed in this paper, deserve thorough research in the future. Furthermore we should 
investigate the impact of institutional factors and especially the role of the welfare state 
institutions on these labour market transitions in an international comparative context.  
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